“I think if we had used force we would have raised the whole of Asia against us and a great deal of public opinion in the rest of the world too. And it would have been quite wrong morally and politically. It was impossible for us as a Labour Government to say that you couldn’t nationalise the oil industry. The Persians had done it the wrong way — but one had to consider the situation, and the provocation. At this time of day it was quite out of the question to think you could revert to old form and act as a big nation throwing in its force to defend its commercial interests. Quite wrong, and certainly quite impossible for us, of all people.

It was hard on Herbert to have this on his plate when he hadn’t been in the Foreign Office five minutes. [Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison] It hurt his reputation all round. That was one of the reasons why I agreed to stay on as Leader after the Election. I wanted to go, but everybody said, ‘No, you must stay, you are our biggest asset,’ and apart from everything else it seemed a bit unfair, when I thought it over, to raise the issue of the Leadership when Herbert, who naturally had expectations, was in this position. Other things being equal, it seemed right to leave time for his reputation to recover. As it turned out, it didn’t make any difference. When I did go in 1955, the Party decided it didn’t want Herbert and chose Gaitskell. [Hugh Gaitskell] I hadn’t anything to do with that. The Leadership of the Labour Party isn’t an hereditary position, one doesn’t choose one’s successor. But Herbert’s chance would have been even smaller in 1951 than it turned out to be in 1955.”