One never knows what will turn up at the Foreign Office. Other countries often shape the agenda.

No one could deny that I had my share of unwelcome surprises during my comparatively brief term of office as Foreign Secretary. One was when Mossadeq, the head of the Persian Government, whose fanaticism bordered on the mental, suddenly had the idea of nationalizing our oil wells at Abadan without negotiation and without any discussion about compensation. The news of this move was conveyed to me by the Persian Ambassador [Ali Soheili] who, poor man, simply recited what he had been told.

I suggested that such a grave change must be discussed.

“I am sorry,” he replied. “I am not allowed to discuss the matter in any way.”

It was a shocking example of modern diplomacy, or lack of diplomacy, of which the subsequent nationalizing of the Suez Canal in defiance of treaties was another.

[Morrison knew better than this. The subject of nationalization preceded Mossadegh, as his predecessor, Ali Razmara, was assassinated after opposing it (two days before Morrison became Foreign Secretary). In March 1951, Parliament passed the succinct Oil Nationalization Law, and it was later expanded and finalized on May 1 after Senate ratification and the Shah’s signed confirmation. The majority of Iranians supported it. Though he played an instrumental part in its fruition, it wasn’t the exclusive brainchild of Mohammad Mossadegh.

Among the claims and counterclaims on both sides, Iran always stipulated that AIOC was to be compensated for its oil properties. Months of intense negotiation with company representatives, British diplomats, and U.S. intermediaries ensued.

Again, Morrison was well aware of this history — he recited it before his peers (along with much more, including the 1949 Supplemental Agreement), in the House of Commons in July 1951.]

The government, of course, considered the Abadan crisis as a matter of urgency, and the Opposition was informed of what was going on, though regrettably they tried to make Party capital out of our alleged running away and allowing valuable oil installations to be stolen. The crux of the matter was that if military action was to be politically effective it should be quick.

My own view was that there was much to be said in favour of sharp and forceful action. The cabinet was, however, left in little doubt that mounting an effective attacking force would take a lot of time and might therefore be a failure. In the end we had to abandon any military project, with the exception that we would have used force if British nationals had been attacked.

The news of the decision of Egypt to abrogate her treaties with us as to the Canal base came to me at an election meeting in South Lewisham when a reporter passed a slip of paper with the brief in formation. It could have been that another surrender to a minor and irresponsible power was imminent. I went back to Downing Street and summoned officials of the Foreign Office. I strongly advocated a stiff line with Egypt and Attlee agreed. [Clement Attlee, British Premier] This crisis arose a mere ten days before the general election of 25 October, 1951, and, of course, the policy on Egypt was afterwards not a Labour Government’s responsibility. But Labour’s intention to resist expulsion from the Canal Zone changed to the new Conservative Government’s agreement to abandon the Suez bases — and this had a direct bearing on Nasser’s subsequent action in seizing the Canal, a waterway guaranteed to be international by solemn convention. [Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian President] The Conservatives then found themselves in the same predicament as the Labour Government at the time of the Abadan crisis: doubts about the military’s ability to mount effective and quick action.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In the end Eden’s government found itself in a hopeless dilemma and felt it must obey the U.N. request to cease military action. [Anthony Eden] Whatever is said about Abadan the Labour Government did not get itself into the troubles and consequences of the Tories over Suez.

[pg. 298]

I had lively memories of the Abadan crisis during my tenure at the Foreign Office. Eden, I think, was burdened by the same problems as the Labour Government at that time. The armed services seemed incapable of quickly backing up a political and economic challenge. Eden was damaged in his own party when his government obeyed the United Nations and withdrew from Egypt. I have little doubt that he was also hampered and bewildered by John Foster Dulles, who had a remarkable and regrettable custom of saying the right thing in the morning and doing the wrong thing in the afternoon. [U.S. Secretary of State] Eden did not deserve the hysterical abuse hurled at him during the Suez controversy. Neither did the brave State of Israel, which had been repeatedly threatened by Nasser. [Did Premier Mossadegh deserve all that hysterical abuse?]