The decision for the United States to enter the Korean war was a diplomatic, or state department, decision, and not a military decision, so revealed former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to the senate investigating committee Thursday.

Mr. Johnson, who was secretary of defense at the time, said it was Secretary of State Acheson who proposed sending military aid to South Korea.

The military establishment, said Mr. Johnson did not disagree; neither did it concur. It merely pointed out the difficulties involved, he told the senators.

This is interesting, since it shows that the military did not then and apparently does not now, consider Korea of strategic importance worthy of the fight that’s going on.

Yet, the state department, which practically shrugged off all interest in Korea some months before the war broke out, was the first to suggest that we enter the war.

If there is a significant point here, it is beyond doubt the apparent fact of unprecedented confusion and incompetence in the state department.

But, now that war has been joined, and one of our country's bitterest struggles has been raging for a year, Korea is militarily significant.

As Gen. Wedemeyer said, we have pitted our best team against the Reds’ third team. We’ve got to beat him decisively. We shall publicly admit defeat by a third rate antagonist, despite the ferocity of his men. and their multiplicity, IF WE ACCEPT MR. ACHESON’S PLAN FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE AT THE 38th PARALLEL.

As Gen. Wedemeyer says, as Gen. MacArthur says, and as Mr. Johnson indicated his belief, too . . . we must defeat the Red Chinese, drive him from Korea entirely, or stand before the world as defeated.

Why?

Because we set out to clear Korea of Reds, and to unite that country.

Anything less is defeat.

[Sec. of State Dean Acheson, Gen. Albert Coady Wedemeyer, and Gen. Douglas MacArthur.]