Diplomatic relations with Britain were broken off on October 22, 1952 by Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadegh. After the Anglo-American backed coup that toppled Mossadegh, they were renewed on December 23, 1953.

A joint announcement issued in Tehran and London, shown below, was released on December 5th. Unbeknownst to the public, it was actually written solely by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister, after corresponding with the new Premier of Iran, Fazlollah Zahedi.

Upon release of the joint message, the British Foreign Office added,

The evening of Dec. 6th, Zahedi announced the news in a radio address. The next day, the government sent eight truck loads of troops to suppress demonstrators, many of whom wore black armbands in protest of the resumed relations.

Ayatollah Kashani, who had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Zahedi not to do it, called for a day of mourning. Shahed, the newspaper of the Toilers’ Party led by Mozaffar Baghai, was also against the move. Both Kashani and Baghai had broken with Mossadegh and supported his ouster.

On December 9th, as Mossadegh’s trial was nearing its end, Vice President Richard Nixon visited Tehran. Two days earlier, three students protesting the resumption of relations and Nixon’s pending visit were shot and killed by security forces.

On Dec. 21st, the new British Charge d’Affaires, Denis Wright, arrived in Tehran, the same day Mossadegh’s verdict was given. He was immediately confronted by two alleged emissaries of the Shah, who broke protocol by insisting he go through them first rather than the usual channels.

Amb. Ali Soheili and wife arrive at London Airport.

On January 26, 1954, Ali Soheili, the first Iranian Ambassador to England since the split, was named. He arrived in London on March 12, 1954, resuming the position he held from Sept. 1950-Jan. 1952. He soon presented his credentials at Buckingham Palace to the Queen and Princess Margaret. He was also a former Prime Minister. The Charge d’Affaires, Amir Khosrow Afshar, was named Dec. 15th, and had been in England since mid January.

On March 26th, two weeks into his new post, Soheili’s London residence was robbed blind by thieves.

Denis Wright’s Post In Iran Got Off To A Disastrous Start (Dec. 1953)

• British Foreign Office | IRAN 1951-1954
• Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) Archive

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JOINT BRITISH-IRANIAN STATEMENT
December 5, 1953

Her Majesty’s Government and the Persian Government have now decided to resume diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors without delay. They will thereafter proceed at the earliest mutually agreed moment to negotiate a settlement of the oil dispute which has recently clouded relations between them and thus to complete the restoration of their traditional friendship. They are confident that, with good will, a solution can be reached which will take account of the national aspirations of the Persian people regarding the natural resources of their country and which, on the basis of justice and equity, will safeguard the honour and interests of both parties.

Thus it is hoped that a real contribution will have been made to the welfare of the two peoples and to the cause of peace and international co-operation.

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The Queen’s Speech on the Opening of Parliament
October 1953

“My Government hope for a renewal of those friendly relations which have been traditional between this country and Persia and for an early resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.”

• From draft approved by the British Cabinet on Oct. 15, 1953 (C.C. (53) 58th Conclusions, Minute 3).

Anthony Eden in the House of Commons
October 20, 1953

“About Persia I hope that a new chapter has opened. There is a new Government there, and to them, and to the Persian people, Her Majesty’s Government wish sincerely to extend once more the hand of friendship. The Persian Government are aware that we are ready to resume diplomatic relations; if this can be done it will then be easier for us to discuss together the complex problem of Persian oil.

I should like to say that the United States Government are working very closely with us in these matters.”

888.2553/11–653: Telegram

No. 381

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹ [Winthrop Aldrich to State Dept.]

London, November 6, 1953—1 p.m.

SECRET

1969. [The] Following [was] suggested and drafted by [the] British and approved by Eden, Rowan and Maud with [the] request it be transmitted by Hoover to Ambassador Henderson: [Anthony Eden, treasurer Leslie Rowan and diplomat John Redcliffe-Maud to Americans Herbert Hoover, Jr. and Loy Henderson.]

“After two London discussions with representatives [of the] Foreign Office, interested Departments and [the] AIOC, the British have made clear that, in their view, to attempt [to] agree on principles at this stage and at long range would be a disservice both to resumption [of] relations and to [the] eventual production [of a] mutually satisfactory solution. The evolution of principles entails resolving so many complexities that much time would be required. [The] British attitude is that resumption [of] relations should be secured forthwith, and that subsequent direct negotiations would be more likely to produce a solution.

2. It therefore appeared that to leave the memorandum (Tehran’s 10222²) with [the] British would not be helpful, and Hoover has not done so.

3. It became clear also that there was misunderstanding between British and Iranians about connecting [the] resumption of relations with [the] opening of oil negotiations. [The] British state they want [the] former on its own merits, because it is wrong that this estrangement between two traditionally friendly countries should exist. It would thereafter be open to [the] Iranians to suggest oil discussions when they like, and [the] British are quite ready to fall in with their wishes.

4. Eden is therefore considering sending Zahedi a message (and/or making a statement in House of Commons) which he hopes would assist Zahedi to agree to exchange Ambassadors forthwith. [Iranian Premier Fazlollah Zahedi] It would be in [the] following term.

Begin. ‛I am very glad to know that you share my wish for a resumption of diplomatic relations as soon as possible. Obviously our countries should be in normal and direct touch. Let me say at once that there is no difference between our governments that cannot be solved with good will. Certainly it is my sincere belief that a fair and just solution to the oil problem can be found. I should like to endorse the wish expressed recently by Mr. Entezam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for a solution based on the twin principles of justice and equity. [Abdollah Entezam] This is exactly the kind of solution that we want. The problem is complex and will require study and time to solve, and we are perfectly ready to leave the choice of time for discussing it to you. I simply feel that for us to be in direct touch will help us both when that time comes. I suggest, therefore that, by simultaneous announcement in Tehran and London, at a time to be agreed on between us, we announce our decision to exchange Ambassadors again without delay’. [End.]

5. The message would have to be presented formally by [the] Swiss Minister. [Alfred Escher] But any preliminaries would be left to you.

6. [The] British would greatly welcome your comments before making up their minds. Do you think that [a] message in those terms, followed perhaps by statement in House, would be enough to bring Zahedi [to] agree [to] resume relations before [the] oil talks? If not, have you any alternative suggestion [that is] likely to achieve this object?”

Aldrich

• [Annotations by Arash Norouzi. Bracketed text added for better readability.]

• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)

Footnotes below from the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian:

¹ Sent to Tehran as telegram 61 and repeated to the Department.

² See footnote 2, Document 384. [Below]:

“On Nov. 12 Ambassador Henderson reported on an additional conversation with the Foreign Minister. Entezam again enlarged on how difficult it would be for the Iranian Government to resume relations with the British without being able to show the Iranian public some evidence that there had been an advance in the direction of an oil settlement. He again referred to the possibility that the British might send an emissary to Tehran to canvass the situation. Henderson said that he had already indicated that the British were unwilling to negotiate or even discuss substantive matters prior to the resumption of relations. Moreover, Henderson thought the British would be unwilling to send a representative to Tehran to discuss a resumption of relations unless they had assurances that such a mission would be a success. Henderson went on to say that he wished to be able to advise London without too much delay about Entezam’s reaction to the idea of Eden’s dispatching a message. Entezam said he would like his reaction to be expressed through a counter-suggestion that the British Government immediately send a representative to Tehran to exchange views regarding a resumption of relations. He asked Henderson if he would be willing to summarize Entezam’s remarks in a telegram to London and to show the draft to him and Zahedi during the course of dinner which Henderson was to have with them that evening. The Ambassador presented the statement to Zahedi and Entezam that evening, and they agreed it was an accurate reflection of their views. They also said they hoped the British Government would be willing to send a trusted emissary to Tehran for discussions. (Telegram 1087; 888.2553/111–253)”

³ Not printed. (888.2553/11–1153)

⁴ On Nov. 13 the Embassy reported in telegram 2084 that the British had expressed great appreciation for Henderson’s skillful handling of his conversations with the Shah, Zahedi, and Entezam and added that Henderson had taken exactly the proper line. Moreover, the British were giving high-level consideration to Henderson’s proposal contained in telegram 1088, Document 384. (Telegram 2084; 888.2553/11–1353)

⁵ Document 381.

⁶ Not printed. (888.2553/10–3153)

⁷ Ambassador Henderson reported on Nov. 16 that the previous day he informed the Foreign Minister that the British Government did not think it would be useful to solve outstanding differences between the two governments except by way of properly accredited representatives. The British were, however, studying the comments made by the Foreign Minister to Henderson to ascertain if there was anything they could do to make it politically easier for the Iranian Government to resume relations at once, and the Swiss Minister would probably deliver the British views during the next day or two. The Foreign Minister expressed his disappointment and said he would immediately inform the Prime Minister and the Shah. (Telegram 1116; 888.2553/11–1653)

• [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]

• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)

Footnotes below from the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian:

¹ Sent to Tehran as telegram 62 and repeated to the Department.

² See Document 386 and footnote 7 thereto.

³ On Nov. 20 Ambassador Henderson responded that he considered the tenor of this statement to be excellent and suggested that this draft be shown informally to the Iranian Foreign Minister as soon as possible to obtain his reactions. He cautioned, however, that the British should not become unduly optimistic that the Iranians were willing at that particular time to resume relations with the United Kingdom in the absence of an oil agreement. He also recommended that friendly pressure should continue to be exerted upon Iran to reestablish relations with the British. (Telegram 1148; 641.88/11–2053) The Department agreed on Nov. 21 that the friendly pressure on the Iranians should not be relaxed. (Telegram 1225; 641.88/11–1953)

• [Annotations by Arash Norouzi] Sent to Tehran as telegram 65 and repeated to the Department. See footnote 3, supra.

• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)

Footnotes below from the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian:

¹ Sent to Tehran as telegram 65 and repeated to the Department.

² See footnote 3, supra. [No. 390 above]

³ On Nov. 28 Ambassador Henderson reported that Eden’s message reached the Swiss Minister only the previous evening, that the Minister delivered it that morning, and that Foreign Minister Entezam seemed to be somewhat disappointed and reserved when given the message. (Telegram 1195; 888.2553/11–2853)

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After 1953 Coup, Henderson Scorns Iranian Conspiracy Theorists