By ERNEST K. LINDLEY

In the inner circle of American officials who have kept close watch day by day on the Iranian crisis it is conceded that W. Averell Harriman, special assistant to the President, accomplished all that could be accomplished under the circumstances. That he failed, or has not yet succeeded, was not his fault.

When Harriman entered the picture, the situation looked practically hopeless. He worked out a formula which made possible the resumption of negotiations between the British and the Iranians. He persuaded the British to come forward with new proposals which represented very great concessions. Indeed, they offered all that the Iranian government, if it had a modicum of common sense, could expect.

The responsibility for the failure of the negotiations is now definitely fixed. It rests on the Iranian government exclusively. But the discussions were broken off in an atmosphere which was considerably less unfriendly than it had been before Harriman went to Teheran. They can be reopened if the Iranian government changes its mind or a new one is formed.

That the Iranians will make a new move of some sort very soon is a practical certainty. Without oil revenues, the Iranian government is going broke. It must also find a way of paying the Iranian oil workers.

The British are abandoning the oil fields. But they have made it plain that if necessary they will put armed forces ashore to protect the refinery at Abadan and the thousands of British employees and their dependents gathered there.

Although Washington would deplore the necessity for such action, it does not deny the right and the duty of the British to protect their nationals. Moreover, the legal rights of the British, sanctioned by treaty, cannot be abrogated by the unilateral action of the Iranian government in nationalizing the oil properties. The British have proposed a new arrangement which accepts nationalization. As a practical matter, they are withdrawing their employees from the oil fields. But until a new arrangement is mutually agreed upon, they have a right to hold their property at Abadan.

If the British are compelled to put armed forces ashore, it is generally feared that the Russians, under the 1921 treaty, will occupy Northern Iran. This would not necessarily lead to an armed conflict. But it would mean the partition of Iran. Even this might be preferable to letting the Russians get all of Iran, which is not an impossibility if economic chaos develops in Iran or if an Iranian government turns in desperation to the Russians for aid in refining and marketing oil.

Harriman has expressed the hope that the Iranian-British negotiations will be resumed. London hopes for a change of government in Iran. But there is at least a chance that the present Iranian government will change its mind and, with the help of some face-saving devices, come around to substantial acceptance of the British proposition. Harriman has made it plain (1) that no American oil companies will come to the aid of Iran and (2) that the British proposition is about as good as the Iranians will ever get. The same proposition could be dressed up a little differently, however, if that would help the Iranian government out of the hole it has dug for itself.

If the men in charge of the Iranian government were merely proud, if they were merely extreme nationalists, or of they were practical socialists, a new agreement would have been worked out before now. But they were also ignorant, abysmally ignorant, about the oil business. Harriman, in slightly more polite language, underscored this point. Indeed, he stated a good many of the facts of life to the Iranians quite bluntly. He did not quite convince them. But apparently they were not alienated by what he said and it is just possible that after thinking it over a little longer they will conclude that they should follow his advice.