Letter to The Washington Post (March 20, 1953)
| The Mossadegh Project | June 22, 2022 |
The retired former U.S. Ambassador to Iran wrote this letter to the editor in the early months of Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first term, unaware that the administration had already begun scheming with Britain to overthrow the Iranian
government.
On March 25th, Sen. Dennis Chávez (Democrat, New Mexico) had Henry Grady’s “very fine letter” entered into the Congressional Record.
The Washington Post
How Stable is Iran?
Reading “Iran Students Demand Premier’s Resignation” in your Feb. 1 issue, I recalled Abraham Lincoln’s words: “You can fool all the people some of the time, some people all of the time, but not all the people all the time.”
I think it is time to stop fooling the American people about the situation in Iran. These days thousands of university students and professors in Tehran demand “freedom or death.” I wonder if your readers get the significance of these
demonstrations. These demonstrations are people demanding freedom were killed in the streets. The government is intolerant of even whispered criticism, and the students face torture and exile, from a government accusing them of
communism. Though the students are not Communists, this naturally provides propaganda for communism.
Since it was brought back to power by foreign factions (interested in oil) in 1953, the regime has imprisoned, tortured and killed thousands. The Shah’s security police is patterned after the Nazi Gestapo.
Ten months ago, the Shah promised to let his people enjoy a free election for the first time. It turned out to be the most rigged one yet. Threefourths of the elected deputies Shah’s friends Several to resign: Now pretend that democracy
exists in Iran, two parties were founded by the Shah two years ago. Combined they represent a total of less than 4000 members throughout the country. The nationalists (supporters of former Premier Mossadegh) did
not have a chance to participate in the election, even though it would be a conservative estimate to say that 80 per cent of the people would have voted for them, if given a chance.
The problem is that America’s massive military and economic aid is associated with support of the policies of the Shah; but the political structure under the crown is shaky, and getting weaker. In spite of pressure from American
officials, the Shah has been powerless to do anything about government corruption, which is rampant. Overwhelming dissatisfaction with the regime provides ideal fertilizer for the growth of communism, which has been steadily increasing
during the past seven years.
The only massive counterweight against communism among the Iranian people, are the nationalists. Yet, the Iranian Embassy here says in its bulletin of Feb. 1, that Mossadegh’s supporters are Communists. The Iranian government seems to
have convinced the State Department that if the Shah is removed, Iran will be in the hands of Communists. The danger of overthrow of the present regime is real and close. Many relatives of the Shah and high in case of coup d'etat.
I wonder if Président Kennedy’s Administration will revise the United States policy for Iran? Has the fate of Ngo’s regime in Viet-Nam, Rhee’s in Korea, and Menderes’ in Turkey, been enough of a lesson for America? Or do they need Iran
also?
HUSSEIN DOOTSMOHAMEDI.
Washington.
The Iranian situation is symptomatic of what is happening throughout what has been and to a degree still is the colonial or semicolonial part of the world. The manner in which we handle this general problem will, in my opinion,
determine whether we win or lose the cold war. The joint British-American failure in Iran should serve as a case study. I am not concerned with blaming, but I am concerned that when a tragic political failure has occurred we should take stock and try to prevent it happening again. It could happen again in any one of a dozen countries. It is accentuated in Iran because of that country’s petroleum resources, but the basic problem is not oil but the traditional and persistent attitude of the Western powers toward the underdeveloped countries of the world.
When we, with our allies, fail in the military sphere as we did in the case of the Bulge, we say our “mea culpas” and endeavor to correct the mistakes that led up to the disaster.
[Battle of the Bulge, WWII] Too many Bulges would have lost the hot war. Too many Irans will lose the cold war.
Colonialism in any form is, historically speaking, as dead as the dodo bird, but despite our long-standing commitment to the principle of the self-determination of peoples, we are actively supporting British and French colonialism
wherever that support is needed, particularly in the Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa. We are helping to resist the efforts of people fired by the passion for independence to become free.
This is not traditional American policy. Unless we insist that the British and the French adjust their policies to the realities of today and refuse to support in any way their colonialism if they persist in it, the vital underdeveloped
areas will abandon their historic friendship toward the West and become in effect part of the Soviet Empire. This is as certain as that the night follows the day.
When Mountbatten turned over power in India to the Indians, he did it in a manner greatly to raise British prestige. [Louis Mountbatten, former Viceroy of India] If the Mountbatten attitude is
wholeheartedly accepted, not only in India but wherever the British have exercised political power, it could increase rather than decrease British trade and constructive influence. This could be true even in Iran if it is not too late.
But it is certainly not too late elsewhere. Such a consummation would be all to the good for Great Britain and the world.
If British prestige and trade suffers anywhere, the Western World suffers. Aside from everything else, we have a vested interest in the British balance of payments. A complete debacle in Iran can mean a loss in the British balance with
the world of $300 million. It is not important that we and our allies are as one in the methods of carrying out our policy of stopping Soviet aggression, as is the policy itself. The key to that is economic advancement in the
underdeveloped countries, not economic disintegration brought on for whatever reasons by economic pressures and sanctions.
HENRY F. GRADY
Former United States Ambassador to Iran.
San Francisco, Calif.
Related links:
Statement on AIOC Mission to Iran | House of Lords, June 20, 1951
The Spirit of Mossadegh | Letter to The Washington Post, Dec. 1979
Letter: Negotiations In Iran | The Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1951
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”



